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I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States and the European Community (EC)
vigorously fought the banana trade war for over six years.1 This
long running dispute resulted from complaints by the United
States and four other Latin American countries,2 that the EC was
using its banana regime to protect its ex-colonies to the
detriment of the Latin American banana producing countries.!
The EC countered with the argument that this regime was
necessary to stabilize the struggling economies of these smaller
nations since the alternative for many is the production of drugs.'
The United States attempted to put an end to the escalating
tensions by threatening to impose tariffs up to 100% on selected
EC goods if the regime was not changed.5
1. See generally David E. Sanger, Miffed at Europe, U.S. Raises Tariffs for Luxury
Goods, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1999, at Al.
2. See WTO Secretariat, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale
and Distribution of Bananas: Request for Consultations by Ecuador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Mexico and the United States, WT/DS27/1 (Feb. 12, 1996) [hereinafter ECBanana Regime]. The four Latin American countries joining the United States in
insisting that the EC change its regime are Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico
[hereinafter G-5 countries].
3. The G-5 countries allege that the EC restrictions improperly denied their
banana producers and exporters access to the EC market through the use of quotas and
import licenses. See id.
4. See Lorraine Woellert, Latin American Bananas Focus of EU Import Proposal,
WASH. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1998, at BlO, availablein LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
5. See UNITED STATES TAKES CUSTOMS ACTION ON EUROPEAN IMPORTS, U.S.T.R.

PRESS RELEASE 99-17 (Mar. 3, 1999) available in <http://www.ustr.gov/releases/
1999/03/99-17.html> (visited Feb. 27, 2000). The United States rejected the changes
made to the 1998 EC that triggered the threat of the imposition of tariffs. See USTR
BARSHEFSKY REACTS TO EC BANANA DECISION, U.S.T.R. PRESS RELEASE 98-63 (June

1998) available in <http://www.ustr.gov/releases/1998/06/98-63.pdf> (visited Feb. 27,
2000). See also Tani Freedman, Slippery Slope? Washington Steps up Trade Threats in
EU Banana Drama, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Oct. 21, 1998, available in 1998 WL
16623267. See generally U.S. RESPONSE TO EU BANANA IMPORT REGIME, USTR PRESS
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Caught in the middle of this transcontinental barrage are
the small Caribbean nations who stand to suffer increased
economic hardship if the banana regime is abolished.6 Coupled
with this is the very real fear for the governments of these
nations that their banana farmers will turn to drug production
out of necessity. This has lead to a rallying call from among the
leaders of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) s to postpone
renewal of their "Shiprider" Maritime Counter-drug Agreements9
with the United States by tying its renewal to the resolution of
the banana issue.1

RELEASE 98-113 (Dec. 21, 1998) available in <http'/www.ustr.gov/releases/1998/12/98113.pdf> (visited Feb. 27, 2000).
6. See Woellert, supra note 4.
7. See Nora Boustany, Yes We Have No Banana Pact, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 1998,
at A50, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
8. At the signing of the Treaty of Chaguaramas in 1973, the Commonwealth
Caribbean Heads of Government founded the Caribbean Community and Common
Market (CARICOM). See 12 I.L.M. 1033 (1973). CARICOM succeeded the Caribbean
Free Trade Association (CARIFTA), which was established in 1968. CARICOM works for
the economic integration of the member countries through the common market,
coordination of the foreign policies of member states, and functional co-operation
See CARICOM Website,
(especially in areas of social and human endeavor).
<http'J/www.caricom.org> [hereinafter CARICOM Website]. The 15 members nations are
Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana,
Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent and the
Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. See id.
9. The purpose of these bilateral agreements between the various Caribbean
nations and the United States, is to combat illicit maritime drug trafficking. See
generally Joseph Kramek, Bilateral Maritime Counter-Drugand Immigrant Interdiction
Agreements: Is this the World of the Future?, 31 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 121 (2000).
See also Agreement Between the United States and Trinidad and Tobago Concerning
Maritime Counter-drug Operations, CTIA Doc. 8668.000, DOS: 96-58 (entered into force
Mar. 4, 1996) [hereinafter T & T Shiprideri.
10. Addressing a town meeting in Castries Sunday, which included U.S.
Congressmen, business executives, and elected officials on U.S.-Caribbean relations,
Barbados's Foreign Minister Billie Miller said that Barbados felt "very strongly" about the
need to express solidarity with the Eastern Caribbean states over U.S. threats to the
banana regime. See B'dos Wants Joint BananaIShipriderAgreement, JAM. GLEANER,
Nov. 12, 1998.
"In recent months, we in the Barbados Cabinet have felt so strongly about
this that we would like to urge CARICOM heads not to renew Shiprider
agreements without they being tied to a resolution of the banana issue,"
[Miller] told the meeting held as part of the Carib News Multi-national
conference.
The Barbados Foreign Minister said the entire Caribbean was also
disappointed with the failure of President Clinton to focus on trade and
economic issues as promised when he met Caribbean leaders last year, while
matters pertaining to justice and security had been put on a fast track.
She said the US had a vested interest in and had largely pursued justice
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This
situation
has
serious
implications
because
approximately "half the population of the Caribbean rely on the
banana industry to supply their basic needs such as food, shelter
and education."1" Compounding this problem is a decrease in aid
level 2 and an increase in the barriers to trade" that have fueled
anti-U.S. feelings,"' as well as anti-World Trade Organization
(WTO) 5 sentiment among governmental
officials
and
representatives of the private sector. 6 The growing fear is that

and security issues as they were associated with the problem of narcotics
control, but had failed to give adequate attention to trade and economic
matters which were vital to Caribbean states.
Id.
11. "Take away the banana industry and the economy collapses," Phil Bloomer of
British-based relief agency Oxfam said in a statement issued on behalf of all U.K.
development agencies. Banana Import Reforms May Trouble Caribbean, OSCEOLA
SENTINEL, July 3, 1998, at 4. The development agencies said planned reforms would
mean trouble for the Caribbean industry because it would be unable to compete with
cheaper bananas produced in Africa by multinationals such as Del Monte and Dole. See
id.
12. See George Gedda, Caribbean Disposition Toward U.S. Not so Sunny,
ASSOCIATED PRESS POL. SERV., Jan. 16, 1998, available in 1998 WL 7376958.
13. See id. Since the end of the Cold War, not much has gone right in U.S. relations
with Caribbean countries. "The Caribbean used to be a major object of U.S. foreign policy.
Now they don't even know it's there," laments Peter Johnson, a former career diplomat
who tries to promote U.S. business ties to the region. Id. "American diplomats in the
region find Caribbean leaders fearful and resentful, wondering whether economic
globalization will leave them destitute." Id.
14. See id.
15. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT 19471. See also Final Act Embodying the Results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTSRESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND VOL. 5 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125. See generally General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-Multilateral Trade Negotiations (The Uruguay Round):
Agreement Establishing the Multilateral Trade Organization, Dec. 15, 1993, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS- RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND VOL. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 13 [hereinafter
GATT 19941.
16. See Jamaica Envoy: Anti-WTO Sentiment Rising In Caribbean, Dow JONES INT'L
NEWS, Dec. 16, 1998. Jamaican Ambassador Richard Bernal, along with the ambassadors
from Belize and St. Vincent and the Grenadines, spoke to reporters in Washington D.C.
on December 16 to discuss the impact of the WTO decision. Bernal stated:
Support for continued membership by Caribbean countries in the World Trade
Organization is eroding because of the WTO ruling that is expected to sharply
reduce banana exports to Europe .... Caribbean countries generally have
been favorably disposed toward multilateral institutions, noting that soon
after independence all joined the World Bank, International Monetary and
the GAIT. They saw these institutions as a protective shield,.... but
nowadays sentiment is changing following the WTO ruling.
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removal of the banana industry will cause the Caribbean
economies to collapse. 7
This comment discusses the strained relation that has
ensued between the United States and the Caribbean nations as
a result of the long running banana dispute. The tension has
culminated in the threat of the loss of the Shiprider agreements,
a threat which the Caribbean nations may use again to gain the
upper hand in negotiations. Part II examines the effects of the
banana dispute to date. Part III discusses the far reaching
implications of the banana dispute on drug production and
trafficking within the Region. Part IV explores the ramifications
of the Caribbean nations' non-renewal of the Shiprider
agreements.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE BANANA DISPUTE
Bananas have long been a subject of dispute in Europe,
notably when the Federal Republic of Germany pushed for the
inclusion of a Banana Protocol as the price for agreeing to the
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community
(EEC)." Then in 1975, the EEC members sought to provide
economic protection to their former colonies: the African,
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) States. Protectionism was at the
heart of the first Lom6 Convention, the purpose of which was
"safe-guarding the interests of the... [ACP] States, whose
economies depended to a considerable extent on the exportation
of commodities." 9 To this end the EEC established a system of
preferences and aid to benefit the ACP countries."
17. See BananaImport Reforms May Trouble Caribbean, supra note 11.
18. The EEC was established by the Treaty of Rome, which was signed on March 5,
1957, and entered into force on January 1, 1958. See 298 U.N.T.S. 11. It was not until
the Treaty on European Union (known as the Maastricht Treaty) was signed on February
7, 1992, and entered into force on November 1, 1993, did the name change to the
European Union (EU). See 1758 U.N.T.S. 3. The Banana Protocol created a tariff quota
on Latin American bananas imported into the Federal Republic of Germany. However
this protocol only applied to the Federal Republic of Germany and not to the other
members of the EEC. See 298 U.N.T.S. 11. See also Jack J. Chen, Going Bananas: How
Can the WTO Heal the Split in the Global Banana Trade Dispute, 63 FORDHAM L. REV.
1283, 1294 (1995).
19. Preamble from European Economic Community-African, Caribbean, & Pacific
Countries: Documents from Lom6 Meeting, 14 LL.M. 595. See generally Chen, supra note
18.
20. See generally MARJORIE LISTER, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
DEVELOPING WORLD: THE ROLE OF THE LOMt CONVENTION (1988).

AND
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However, while the ACP countries benefited from the Lom6
agreements, the non-ACP banana producing countries suffered
severe economic losses due to the decline in banana exports."'
This led a group of five Latin American banana-producing
countries-Columbia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Nicaragua and
Venezuela-to file a complaint with the GATT against the EC,
alleging violations of GATT principles.22 The system established
by the GATT to settle disputes places an emphasis on bilateral
resolutions, and only after negotiations are shown to be
unsuccessful will a WTO Dispute Settlement Panel (DSP) be
convened.23 The only way a panel ruling achieves legal binding
status is if the GATT Council adopts it.24
The DSP concluded that the EC banana system was
inconsistent with Article XI.1 (quantitative restrictions)2 as well
as Article I (Most-Favoured-Nation clause)2 of GATT 1994.
While Article XXIV permits preferential treatment between
contracting parties in either a customs union or a free-trade
area,27 the type of agreements under the Lomd Convention did

21. See GATT ACTIVITIES 1993: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF THE WORK OF THE GATT 32
(1994).
22. See id. See also Zsolt K. Bessko, Going Bananas Over EEC Preferences?A Look
at the Banana Trade War and the WTO's Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 28 CASE W. RES. J. INTL L. 265, 266 n.6 (1996). A
Panel was established and subsequently ruled in favor of the Latin American countries.
See id. See also EEC-Member States' Import Regime for Bananas, GATT Panel Report,
June 3, 1993, restricted document, DS32/R. See generally Richard Lyons, European
Union Banana Controversy, 9 FLA. J. INT'L L. 165 (1994).
23. See Peter Lichtenbaum, Proceduralissues in WTO Dispute Resolution, 19 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 1195, 1199 (1998). These panels consist of experts who review the submissions
of the interested parties and then rule on the dispute. See id.
24. See id.
25. The Panel found that the quantitative restrictions placed on the imports of
bananas were inconsistent with the obligation of the general elimination of quantitative
restrictions as between contracting parties. See GATT ACTIVITIES 1993, supra note 21, at
32-33.
26. Article I bestows on all members of the GATT a "general most-favoured-nation
treatment," by stating that "any advantage, favour, privilege, or immunity granted by any
contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any country shall be
accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined
for the territories of all other contracting parties." GATT 1994, supra note 15, art. I. See
also GATT ACTIVITIES 1993, supra note 21, at 32-33 (where the tariff preference given to
the import of bananas from ACP countries was found to be inconsistent with the MFN
clause).
27. The purpose of a customs union or of a free-trade area should be to facilitate
trade between the constituent territories and not to raise barriers to the trade of other
contracting parties with such territories. See GATT 1994, supra note 15, art. XXIV.4.

20001

NON-RENEWAL OF SHIPRIDER

The DSP
not qualify for either of these exceptions. 8
recommended that either the Contracting Parties request that
the EC conform to the GATT principles, or the EC could seek to
maintain its preferences by seeking an exemption under Article
XXV. 21 It is notable, however, that this Panel Report was not
adopted by the GATT Council."
The EC expanded on these preferences within the fourth
Lom6 Convention3 1 (hereinafter Lomd IV) by making allowances

that "[piroducts originating in the ACP States shall be imported

into the Community free of customs duties." 2 These preferential
provisions contained within the Lom6 IV were challenged once
again by the Latin American countries as being inconsistent with
the principles of GATT, however, this time the EC was able to
obtain a waiver allowing the provisions of the Lom6 IV to remain
in effect until the year 2000."3

28. See GATT ACTIVITIES 1993, supra note 21, at 33; GATT 1994, supra note 15, Art.
XXIV.8. A customs union is defined as the substitution of a single customs territory for
two or more customs territories. A free-trade area is defined as a group of two or more
customs territories. Both require reciprocal concessions to all members within the
territories, however, with the Lomd Convention, the concessions were one-sided in the
favor of the ACP countries. This is the reason why the Panel Report ruled against the
EEC's reference to Art. XXIV to justify the preferential treatment awarded to the ACP
countries. See id.
29. See GATT ACTIVITIES 1993, supra note 21, at 33. See also GATT 1994, supra
note 15, Art. XXV.5, which provides for a waiver of obligations in "exceptional
circumstances not elsewhere provided for in this Agreement, the CONTRACTING PARTIES
may waive an obligation imposed upon a contracting party by this Agreement; Provided
that any such decision shall be approved by a two-thirds majority of the votes cast." This
essentially means that the EEC could get an exemption for its banana system by
presenting to the GATT the "exceptional reasons" why the ACP countries needed to be
afforded the protection of the EEC preferential treatment.
30. See GATT ACTIVITIES 1994-1995: A REVIEW OF THE WORK OF THE GATT IN 1994

& 1995, 42 (Apr. 1996).
31. See Fourth AACP-EEC Convention of Lom6, art. 168(1), signed into force in
Lome, Togo, Dec. 15, 1989, 1991 O.J. (L 229) 3 [hereinafter Lom6 V].
32. FOURTH ACP-EEC CONVENTION OF LOMI-COMPILATION OF TEXTS XV (1992).
33. See GATT Doc. L/7604 Dec. 19, 1994. The EC requested this waiver citing the
need to improve the "standard of living," and the financial and "economic development of
the ACP States." Id. Due to the shift from the GATT to the WTO, the EC had to petition
the WTO to extend the Lom6 waiver. See id. This was because any waiver in effect on
the date the WTO Agreement entered into force would terminate, unless extended, two
years later. This meant that the Lom6 waiver would expire on December of 1996. See
WTO Secretariat, The Fourth ACP-EC Convention of Lome: Request for an Extension of a
Waiver, G/LJ108 (Sept. 9, 1996). The extension was granted and allowed the Lom waiver
to remain in place until February 29, 2000. See WTO Secretariat, The Fourth ACP-EC
Convention of Lomg: Extension of Waiver, Decision of 14 Oct. 1996, WTI.186 (Oct. 18,
1996).
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The most significant changes came in 1993, when the EC
adopted Council Regulation 404/93, which created a series of
quota restrictions and licensing requirements for non-ACP
countries to follow.

4

This regulation essentially allows for the

tariff-free importation into the EC by traditional ACP banana
producers while enforcing tariffs and a quota on the bananas
from both non-traditional ACP nations and third-countries. 5
Once again the EC found themselves in front of the WTO on
allegations that this Regulation was not in accord with many
WTO articles." The real surprise was that the United States,
who is not a banana producing exporter country, joined the Latin
American countries in filing a complaint against the EC. 7
After failing to reach a settlement on this dispute, the G-5
Settlement
the
WTO
Dispute
countries,
following
34. See Council Regulation 404/93 on the Common Organisation of the Market in
Bananas, 1993 O.J. (L 47) 1. Article 18 states:
1. A tariff quota of two million tennes (net weight) shall be opened each year
for imports of third-country bananas and non-traditional ACP bananas.
Within the framework of the tariff quota, imports of third-country bananas
shall be subject to a levy of ECU 100 per tonne and imports of non-traditional
ACP bananas shall be subject to a zero duty. For the second half of 1993, the
volume of the tariff quota shall be set at one million tonnes (net weight).
2. Apart from the quota referred to in paragraph 1,
-imports of non-traditional ACP bananas shall be subject to a levy of ECU 750
per tonne,
-imports of third country bananas shall be subject to a levy of ECU 850 per
tonne.
Article 19 lists the licensing requirements:
1. The tariff quota shall be opened from July 1, 1993 for:
(a) 66.5 per cent. to the category of operators who marketed third country
and/or non-traditional ACP bananas;
(b) 30 per cent. to the category of operators who marketed third Community
and/or traditional ACP bananas;
(c) 3.5 per cent. to the category of operators established in the Community
who started marketing bananas other than Community and/or traditional
ACP bananas from 1992.
The import opportunities pursuant to (a) and (b) shall be available to
operators established in the Community who marketed on their own accord a
minimum quantity of bananas of the above origins, to be determined.
35. See id.
36. See EC-Banana Regime, supra note 2. The G-5 countries allege inconsistencies
in GATT 1994 (Articles I-I, X, XI and XIII), the Agreement on Import Licensing
Procedures (Articles 1 and 3), the Agreement on Agriculture, the General Agreement on
Trade in Services (Articles II, IV, XVI and XVII), and the Agreement on Trade-Related
Investment Measures (Articles 2 and 5). See id. It is also alleged that these measures
produce distortions that appear to nullify or impair the benefits accruing to the
complainants. See id.
37. See id.
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Understanding" (DSU) procedures, requested the establishment
In May 22,
of a Panel to examine the EC's banana regime."
regime,
banana
EC's
1997, the DSP announced that the
of
violation
in
otherwise known as Regulation 404/93, was
'
several WTO articles. The EC launched an appeal on July 11,
1997, protesting nineteen findings of the DSP, one of which was
the right of the United States to bring a claim against the EC
regime. 4 1
since it did not have a "legal interest" in the EC banana
The WTO Appellate Body (AB) subsequently upheld the
DSP's findings of violations caused by the EC banana regime,
which the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) adopted. The
AB agreed with the DSP's finding that there is no explicit
requirement in the DSU that Members have a "legal interest"
before requesting a panel.4" In addition the AB reasoned that
under Article XXIII:I of the GATT 1994, and Article 3.7 of the
38. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-Multilateral Trade Negotiations
(The Uruguay Round): Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes, art. 7, 33 I.L.M. 112 [hereinafter DSUI. "If the consultations fail to settle a
dispute within sixty days after the request for consultations, the complaining party may
request the establishment of a panel." Id. art. 4.7, 33 I.L.M. at 117. See also THE WTO
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES: A COLLECTION OF THE LEGAL TEXTS 6 (Aug. 1995).
Generally, the panel procedures shall not exceed six months. See id. art. 12.8. Sixty days
after the panel report is given to all the WTO members, it becomes the official ruling of
the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) unless there is a unanimous vote to reject it. See id.
art. 16.4. Any party to the dispute may appeal by formally notifying the DSB of its
decision to do so at anytime during this sixty day time period. See id.
39. See WTO Secretariat, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale
and Distributionof Bananas:Request for the Establishment of a Panel, WT/DS27/6 (Apr.
12, 1996).
40. See WTO Secretariat, WTO Dispute Settlement Panel Reports, WT/DS27/R/ECU
(complaint by Ecuador), WT/DS27IRGTM (complaint by Guatemala and Honduras),
WT/DS27/R/MEX (complaint by Mexico), and WT/DS27/R/USA (complaint by the United
States) (May 22, 1997). The Panel concluded that "the EC's import regime for bananas is
inconsistent with its obligations under Articles I: 1, III: 4, X: 3 and XII: 1 of the GATT,
Articles 1.2 and 1.3 of the Licensing Agreement, and Articles II and XVII of the GATS."
WT/DS27/R/USA. The Panel then recommended "the Dispute Settlement Body request
the European Communities to bring its import regime for bananas into conformity with
its obligations under GATT, the Licensing Agreement and the GATS." Id.
41. See WTO Secretariat, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale
and Distribution of Bananas: Notification of an Appeal by the European Communities
Under Paragraph4 of Article 16 of the Understandingon Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes, WTIDS27/9 (June 13, 1997). See also Rodrigo Bustamante,
The Need for a GATT Doctrine of Locus Standi: Why the United States Cannot Stand the
European Community's BananaImport Regime, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 533 (1997).

42. See WTO Secretariat, European Communities-Regime for the Importation,Sale
and Distribution of Bananas, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9,
1997).
43. See id. 91132.
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DSU, a Member has broad discretion in deciding whether to
bring a case under the DSU by deciding if such action would be
fruitful."
The AB also agreed with the DSP's statement
regarding the consequences flowing from an increased
interdependence of the global economy, drawing the conclusion
that the EC banana regime, in affecting the world supplies and
prices of bananas, would in turn also affect the United States's
internal market for bananas.45
In concluding its report, the AB recommended that the DSB
request the EC to bring the measures found to be inconsistent
into conformity with the EC's obligations under the GATT 1994
and the General Agreement on Trade in Services. 6 The EC was
then given a "reasonable period of time" in which to implement
the DSB's recommendations, which is usually no longer than
fifteen months from the date of adoption of an AB report.47 The
United States and the G-5 countries argued that full
implementation would be practicable within a nine-month
period," while the EC pushed for a period of fifteen months and
one week." In January 8, 1998, the WTO arbitrator gave the EC
until January 1, 1999, to comply with the WTO rulings."
The EC presented a partial modification of the DSB
recommendations with the adoption of Council Regulation No.
1637/98 on July 20, 1998,"' which the United States declared as
44. See id. 134-35. The wording of GATT 1994, supra note 15, Article XXIII.1,
which states, "If any Member should consider...", is especially important in determining
standing when compared with Article 3.7 of the DSU, supra note 38, which states, "Before
bringing a case, a Member shall exercise its judgment as to whether action under these
procedures would be fruitful."
45. See European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distributionof
Bananas, at 136.
46. See id. T1257. See also DSU, supra note 35, art. 19.1 which states that: "Where a
panel or Appellate Body concludes that a measure is inconsistent with a covered
agreement, it shall recommend that the Member concerned bring the measures into
conformity with that agreement."
47. See DSU, supra note 38, art. 21.3(c).
48. See WTO Secretariat, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale
and Distributionof Bananas:Arbitration Under Article 21.3(c) of the Understandingon
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, WT/DS27/15, at 9115 (Jan. 7,
1998).
49. See id. $ 5.
50. See id. The Arbitrator concluded that the "reasonable period of time" for the EU
implementation of the DSB recommendations and rulings was fifteen months, not the
nine months the G-5 countries argued for.
51. 1998 O.J. (L 210). See generally WTO Secretariat, European CommunitiesRegime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas: Status Report by the
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inconsistent with the DSB ruling. 2 The EC later adopted
Council Regulation No. 2362/98 in October 28, 1998,"3 and
announced that they had completed the implementation of the
recommendations and rulings as put forth by the DSB.54 Once
again the United States insisted that the EC had not fully
complied, and lodged a complaint with the WTO asserting their
rights to have the
WTO panel review the consistency of the EC
55
banana regime.

The
European Communities, Addendum, WTJDS27/17/Add.1 (Sept. 9, 1998).
modifications of the EC banana regime by Council Regulation 1637/98 that were found to
be incompatible with the WTO were changed. See Directorate General for Trade, The
US/EU BananaDispute: Modifications to the EC BananaRegime, (last modified Nov., 10
However, the GAfT'-bound
1998) <http://europa.eu.int/commdg01l1011banan.htm>.
tariff quota and tariff preference for ACP products inside and outside of the tariff quota
had not been contested before the WTO. See id. The EC asserts that the quantity set
forth for ACP bananas is not an allocation as within a tariff quota, but is actually a
limitation of the quantity which can benefit from the Lom6 preferential treatment. See
id.
52. See USTR BARsHEFSKY REACTS TO EC BANANA DECISION, supra note 5. U.S.
Ambassador Barshefsky criticized the preliminary changes made by the EC to its banana
regime saying that they failed to bring the regime in line with the EC's WTO
commitments and that the United States would not hesitate to take all available action to
protect U.S. interests, including the withdrawal of concessions on EC goods and services.
See id.
53. 1998 O.J. (L 293) 32.
54. See WTO Secretariat, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale
and Distributionof Bananas: Status Report by the European Communities, addendum 3,
WT/DS27/17/Add.3 (Nov. 13, 1998).
55. The G-5 countries also sought to have the WTO panel review the EC's amended
banana regime, but wanted the panel to focus on: (1) the consistency with GATT Article
XIII in regards to quantities allocated and conditions of access; (2) the consistency of the
EC importer licenses with GATS Articles II and XVII; and (3) the consistency of the tariff
quotas with GATT Article I and the WTO Lom6 waiver. See WTO Secretariat, European
Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distributionof Bananas: Recourse to
Article 21.5 of the DSU, WT/DS27/21 (Sept. 9, 1998). The United States along with
Ecuador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Mexico (the G-5 countries) asserted their right
under Article 21.5 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 38, which
states, "Where there is a disagreement as to the existence or consistency with a covered
agreement of measures taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings such
dispute shall be decided through recourse to these dispute settlement procedures,
including wherever possible resort to the original panel." Id.
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Use andAbuse of the WTO Dispute Settlement
Procedures

The United States announced that the EC's inaction left
them no choice but to impose tariffs on selected EC goods.56 The
United States justified their imposition of these tariffs by
asserting that Article 22 of the WTO Dispute Settlement
Procedures permits them to suspend concessions to the EC.57 The
United States defended the imposition of tariffs on EC goods
asserting that it is an acceptable compensation for the losses
suffered due to the EC banana regime."8 The EC countered by
claiming that it was an improper unilateral action,59 and
requested the establishment of a panel" to the WTO based on
56. See U.S. RESPONSE TO EU BANANA IMPORT REGIME, supra note 5.

57. Article 22.2 of the DSU, supranote 38, states that if the Member concerned fails
to bring the measure found to be inconsistent into compliance, or otherwise comply with
the recommendations and rulings within the reasonable time, then the party invoking the
dispute settlement procedures may request authorization from the DSB to suspend
concessions to that Member.
58. See WTO Secretariat, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale
and Distributionof Bananas:Recourse by the United States to Article 22.2 of the DSU,
WT/DS27/43 (Jan. 14, 1999). The United States estimates that the EC's failure to comply
with the WTO recommendations resulted in a loss to U.S. exports totaling $520 million.
See id. This includes the loss of U.S. exports of goods and services used in the production
of Latin American bananas for the EC market, as well as lost profits of the U.S. service
suppliers on the distribution and sale of Latin American bananas in the EC market. See
id.
59. The DSU emphasizes that "[t]he aim of the dispute settlement mechanism is to
secure a positive solution to a dispute. A solution mutually acceptable to the parties in a
dispute.., is clearly preferred." DSU, supra note 38, art. 3.7. By including these terms
in the DSU, the members of the GATT explicitly denounced the use of unilateral actions
in solving disputes amongst themselves. See id. Article 23.2(a) states that Members shall
not make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred. See id. The correct
steps to follow are through the DSU rules and procedures that leave the ultimate decision
up to the DSB. See id. See generally William R. Sprance, The World Trade Organization
and the United States' Sovereignty: The Political and ProceduralRealities of the System,
13 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1225 (1998). By such actions the U.S. is choosing to ignore its
own obligations to the GATT, but by doing so can provoke retaliatory action, which in
turn threatens the future existence of the VTO. See id. Concerns about the Unites
States leaning toward unilateralism have been voiced by Senator Paul S. Sarbanes, who
stated, "In effect, it is the belief that since we are the great superpower, we can set all the
rules and insist that others conform to them." Paul S. Sarbanes, The Danger of
Unilateralism: U.S. Interests in the Post-Cold War Era, 5 BROWN J. OF WORLD AFF. 61
(1998).

60. See WTO Secretariat, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale
and Distributionof Bananas:Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the European
Communities, WT/DS27/40 (Dec. 15, 1998). The panel's mandate would be to find if the
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Article 21.5 of the DSU. 6" The EU argued that the correct
procedure under the DSU is to have the original panel reconvene
to settle the dispute.2 In the mean time, Ecuador tired of the
maneuvers on both sides, filed its own complaint to the WTO.63
In it, Ecuador requested reactivation of the consultations
previously started in September 1998, which had originally ruled
on the changes made to the EC banana regime."
Meanwhile, the January 1, 1999, deadline has since come
and gone with still no definite end in sight to this mess. Upon
seeing no further action by the EC to amend its banana regime,
once more the United States requested authorization from the
DSB to suspend the application of tariff concessions and
obligations to the EC.6 5 As required under DSU Article 4.4, the
G-5 countries requested an opportunity to consult with the EC to
negotiate a settlement.6 6 The negotiations between the United
States and the EC quickly stalled, causing WTO DirectorGeneral Renato Ruggiero to intervene by suggesting a
compromise proposal.67 Both parties agreed to follow the DSU
whereby "the U.S. request for suspension of concessions against
EC implementing measures are to be afforded the presumption that they conform to the
WTO rules, unless said conformity has been duly challenged under the appropriate DSU
procedures. See id.
61. The DSU prohibits the authorization of suspension of concessions or other
obligations if a covered agreement prohibits such suspension. See DSU, supra note 38,
art. 21.5.
62. See European Communities-Regime for the Importation,Sale and Distributionof
Bananas: Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the European Communities, supra
note 60.
63. See WTO Secretariat, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale
and Distributionof Bananas:Request to Reactivate Consultations of 17 September 1998 by
Ecuador,WT/DS27/30 (Nov. 16, 1998).
64. See id.
65. See European Communities-Regime for the Importation,Sale and Distributionof
Bananas: Recourse by the United States to Article 22.2 of the DSU, supra note 58. The
position of the United States is that new EC regulations perpetuate the discriminatory
aspects of the EC measures that were found to be GATT inconsistent, and the EC has
therefore failed to bring the EC banana regime into conformity with its WTO obligations.
Id.
66. The goals of the G-5's negotiation are to "clarify and discuss in detail ... the
various aspects of the EC's modified banana regime, including their effect on the market,
our concerns about their WTO-inconsistency, and ways that the EC might modify its
regime in order to produce a satisfactory settlement." WTO Secretariat, European
Communities-Regime for the Importation,Sale and Distributionof Bananas:Request for
Consultations by Honduras, Guatemala, Panama, and the United States, WT/DS158/1
(Jan. 25, 1999).
67. See WTO, What's New: EC, US Accept Ruggiero Compromise on Banana Dispute
(visited Feb. 22, 2000) < http://www.wto.org/wto/new/dsweb.htm>.
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the EC would be authorized by the DSB only after the decision of
an arbitrator on the level of suspension of the concessions. '
The EC, still upset by the U.S. threat of tariffs, requested a
WTO panel to look into possible WTO inconsistencies of Sections
301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, which is what the United
States used as a basis of its rights to impose the tariffs.69 The EC
also lodged another request to the WTO objecting to the "level of
suspension proposed by the United States in document
WT/DS27/43." 70 Not to be outdone, the United States once again

contacted the WTO and requested authorization from the DSB to
suspend concessions to the EC pending the Arbitrators' decision
on March 2, 1999.71
However, on March 2, 1999, the Arbitrators informed the
DSB that they needed additional information to properly
determine the level of suspension of concessions permitted by the
United States. 72

Then on March 4, 1999, the United States

stunned the world when they announced that they would begin
the process of imposing the tariffs on the EC goods since the
deadline was triggered on March 3, 1999.7
In the interim,
68. Id. The arbitrator would be the original panel that had examined the EC's
banana regime. See id. See also WTO, What's New: Statement by DSB Chairman(visited
Feb. 22, 2000) <http://www.wto.org/wto/new/lo01O299.htm>.
69. See WTO Secretariat, United States-Section 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974:
Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the European Communities, WT/DS152/11
(Feb. 2, 999). The EC argued that Section 301-310 is inconsistent with the GATT in that
it permits the imposition of strict time limits within which a unilateral determination is
to be made that another WTO Member has failed to comply with their WTO obligations.
See id. Additionally, the EC argued that Section 301-310 imposes trade sanctions on
Members. See id. See generally Scott Storper, Double Jeopardy'sDoor Reuolues Again in
Untied States v. Dixon: The Untimely Death of the "Same Conduct" Standard, 49 U.
MiAMI L. REV. 881 (1995).

70. See id. The main thrust of the EC's argument is that the previous banana
regime, found to be inconsistent with the WTO, expired on January 1, 1999.
Furthermore, no determination has been made through dispute settlement as to whether
the new EC banana regime is inconsistent as well. See generally wTO Secretariat,
European Communities-Regime for the Importation,Sale and Distributionof Bananas:
Request by the European Communities for Arbitration Under Article 22.6 of the DSU,
WT/DS27/46 (Feb. 3, 1999).
71. See WTO Secretariat, European Communities-Regime for the Importation,Sale
and Distribution of Bananas:Recourse by the United States to Article 22.7 of the DSU,
WTDS27/47 (Feb. 18, 1999). See also DSU, supra note 38, art. 22.7.
72. See WTO Secretariat, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale
and Distributionof Bananas:Arbitration UnderArticle 22.6 of the DSU: Communication
From the Arbitrators,WT/DS27/48 (Mar. 2, 1999).
73. See generally James Cox, U.S. Imposes Duties Pending Banana Ruling, USA
TODAY, Mar. 4, 1999, at B1. See also Sanger, supra note 1.
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collection of these duties are suspended until the WTO rules on
the proper tariff amounts, but importers are required to post
bonds to cover the amounts.74
In response to the actions taken by both the United States
and the EC, WTO Director-General Ruggiero issued a statement
on March 8, 1999, calling for the two parties to "seek a solution
by mutual agreement and not by imposing rulings on either
side."75 He ended this statement by reminding all that:
The real issue is not the credibility of our Dispute Settlement
System which is at stake. The system is-and will continue to
be-ready to give its legal response to the disputes which are
brought to it. It is the users of the system who will put their
credibility at stake if they do not act in conformity with the
letter and the spirit of the system, which seeks above all to
produce mutually acceptable settlements.
B. Decision by the Arbitratorson Article 22.6 of the

DSU
The eagerly anticipated Arbitrators decision under Article
22.6 was released on April 9, 1999, settling the question of
whether the level of suspension imposed by the United States
was "equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment"7"
suffered due to the EC's banana regime."8 The arbitrators found
in favor of the U.S. assertions that there was a continuation of
the nullification or impairment of the U.S. benefits under the
revised EC banana regime."9 The focus of the decision then
74. See Cox, supra note 73.
75. See WTO, What's New: Statement by the Director-General,8 March 1999 (visited
Feb. 22, 2000) <http://www.wto.orgfwto/new/dgstat8.htm>.
76. Id.
77. DSU, supra note 38, art. 22.7, 33 I.L.M. at 128.
78. WTO Secretariat, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas: Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities Under
Article 22.6 of the DSU, Decision by the Arbitrators, WT/DS27/ARB (Apr. 9, 1999)
[hereinafter Arbitrator's Decision]. For a discussion of the decision of the arbitrators, see
Michael M. Phillips, WTO Supports U.S. Over EU On Bananas,WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 1999,
at A3, and David E. Sanger, Ruling Allows Tariffs by US. Over Bananas: But Penalties
on EuropeFall Short of Request, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1999, at C21.
79. See Arbitrator's Decision, supra note 78, at T 5.96. The arbitrators found that
the reservation of the 857,700 tonne limit on traditional ACP imports was a tariff quota
and as such is inconsistent with Article XIII. See id. The revised EC regime also created
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shifted to whether the level of suspension of concessions was
appropriate given the circumstances."0 Reiterating that these
types of counter-measures were not to be used as punitive
measures,8' the arbitrators looked to the amount of actual
impairment suffered by U.S. trade due to the revised EC regime
as a basis for their calculations. 2
To reach a decision, the arbitrators looked into the issues of
"indirect and direct" benefits, service calculations, and company
specific effects versus the overall effect on the United States."
With respect to the indirect and direct benefits, Article XXIII: 1 of
the GATT and Article 3.3 of the DSU provide that if these
benefits are impaired, then measures may be taken. 4 However,
while the direct losses in the trade of U.S. goods and services to
the EC may be counted, the loss trade from between other third
countries do not even amount to a loss of indirect benefits. 5 With
service calculations, the conclusion reached was that losses in the
supply of value-adding service transactions could only be made
by the country of origin and not by the United States." Lastly,
a "de facto less favourable treatment" of license allocation towards U.S. suppliers of
wholesale services, thus violating GATS Articles II and XVII.
See id.
5.97.
Additionally, the criteria stated in order for U.S. service suppliers to acquire the
.newcomer" status also contained less than favorable conditions of competition than those
for the EC service suppliers. See id. This, too, was found to be in violation of GATS
Article XVII. See id. 5.97.
80. See id. § VI.
81. The arbitrators looked to the language of Article 22.1 for the objectives of these
counter-measures which states that they are to be enacted on a temporary basis when the
recommended changes are not implemented within a reasonable time. See id. 6.3. The
purpose of these counter-measures is to "inducecompliance." Id.
82. Id. § VI(B). The United States tried to argue that included in the calculation of
its overall trade loss are the those losses resulting from the export of goods and services
with third parties as well as the loss of exports incorporated in the manufacture of the
Latin American bananas. See id. T 6.12. However, these losses have no bearing on those
that occurred in this matter between the EC and the United States. See id. The
arbitrators were also concerned with "double counting" due to overlapping claims that
would result from the same loss in trade from the United States and third parties. Id. I
6.15. This would be in direct contradiction with the equivalence standard set out in
Article 22 of the DSU, which is that the level of concessions must be equivalent to the
level of nullification and impairment suffered, not more. See id. T 6.16.
83. See id. § VI.
84. See id. T 6.7.
85. See id. T 6.12.
86. See id. 6.26. The arbitrators emphasized the language in Article XXVIII(b) of
the GATS, which provides that the supply of services includes the production,
distribution, marketing, sale and delivery of a service. See id. Also, Article XXVIII(d), (f),
(g), (1)-(n) of the GATS states that the origin of a service supplier is determined on the
basis of ownership and control. See id. It does not matter at which point of trade the

20001

NON-RENEWAL OF SHIPRIDER

the arbitrators noted that they needed to determine the
aggregate net effects on all U.S. suppliers of wholesale services to
the bananas wholesaled in the EC, in order to arrive at the
correct value of the benefits involved.87
The next step involved was determining the correct levels of
In order to have a fair
impairment and suspensions."
comparison, the arbitrators compared the value of the relevant
EC imports from the United States under the present regime to
their value under a WTO-consistent regime. 8 The differences in
the United States's and the arbitrator's calculation boiled down
to whether the EC would have its tariff quota and the subsequent
Looking at the various
impact of the license system.90
choose
as a base for a WTOarbitrators
the
alternatives,
consistent regime a global tariff of 2.553 million tonnes (subject
to a seventy-five Euro per tonne tariff) and unlimited access for
ACP bananas at a zero tariff.9 '
The arbitrators then employed this WTO-consistent regime
to determine the losses suffered by the United States. The task
was therefore to look at what would happen to both the U.S.
share of the wholesale trade services in bananas sold to the EC,
and to the U.S. share of the import licenses and quota rents. 2
Bearing all this in mind, the arbitrators determined that the
appropriate compensation for the level of nullification and
impairment is U.S. $191.4 million per year, which is consistent
with what is required in Article 22.4 of the DSU. 93

harm occurred because it is the right of the country of origin to claim harm for actual or
potential losses in the supply of service transactions that add value to the bananas up to
the free on board stage, and as such, these claims cannot be made by the United States.
87. See Arbitrator's Decision, supra note 77, 6.27.
88. See id. § VII.
89. See id. 917.1.
90. See id. T1 7.2 & 7.6.
91. See id. 917.7.
92. See id. 917.8.
93. See id. 918.1. The comparable basis for estimation used by the arbitrators is the
impact on the value of relevant EC imports from the United States and not the U.S. firms'
costs and profits. See id. On April 9, 1999, the U.S. Trade Representative released the
final product list on which they would impose the 100% ad valorem duties. See USTR
ANNOUNCES FINAL PRODUCT LIST IN BANANAS DISPUTE, U.S.T.R. PRESS RELEASE 99-35
(Apr. 9, 1999) available in <http://www.ustr.gov/releases/1999/04/99-35.html> (visited
Feb. 27, 2000).
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III. Loss OF BANANAS LEADING TO DRUG PRODUCTION AND
TRAFFICKING IN THE CARIBBEAN REGION

A very real threat facing the Caribbean nations is the
pervasiveness of drugs in the region.94 Many believe, the future
of the drug trade in the Caribbean is intimately related to the
future of the banana trade. 5 More specifically, there is a concern
that if the protection provided the Caribbean nations by EU
banana regime is removed or reduced, these countries will be
"thrown into economic chaos."" If Caribbean governments faced
with this dilemma allow financial laxity, money laundering may
become more prevalent and farmers may start growing
alternative cash crops as they have done in Bolivia, Peru and
Colombia. 7
Arguing that a prosperous banana industry was the best
bulwark against the spread of drug growing and trafficking in
the region, Allan Cruishank, the foreign minister of St. Vincent
and the Grenadines stated, "How can we convince our own
citizens about the need to combat the production, use and trade
in illicit drugs if our banana industry is destroyed?" 9 This
sentiment was echoed in the Windwards where Washington D.C.
was criticized on the grounds that "no campaign against drugtrafficking stands a chance of success if growing and transporting
drugs is the only game in town."9 Disaster is lurking just around
the corner, for if the banana industry is abolished "these
94. See generally IVELAW LLOYD GRIFFITH, DRUGS AND SECURITY IN THE CARIBBEAN:
SOVEREIGNTY UNDER SIEGE (1997).

95. "I want to point out that drug trafficking, money laundering and bananas are all
interrelated," said Elizabeth Symon, the British junior minister in charge of the
Caribbean. Serge F. Kovaleski & Douglas Farah, Organized Crime Exercises Clout in
island Nations, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 1998, at A01,available in 1998 WL 2468237. 'We
are trying to keep the islands from the awful downward spiral into drug trafficking and
money laundering." Id.
96. See Woellert, supra note 4.
97. Commonwealth Deputy Secretary-General Sir Humphrey Maud stated, "It is
very short-sighted of them (the US) to pursue any policy which could have very grave
economic and political consequences for their near neighbours. If you lose your primary
source of income, you may be tempted into highly undesirable activities." Banana's Loss
Could Mean Gain for Drugs, OrganisedCrime, JAM. GLEANER, July 7, 1998.
98. EU &US on Collision Course: January Could be Crunch Time in Dispute Over
Market Rules, LATIN AMERICA REGIONAL REPORTS: CARIBBEAN & CENTRAL AMERICA, Nov.

3, 1998, at 7, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File.
99. WTO Panel Ruling on Banana Market Heralds Bleak Future for Windwards,
LATIN AMERICA REGIONAL REPORTS: CARIBBEAN & CENTRAL AMERICA, Mar. 25,

availablein LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File.
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economies go bust. And when they cannot grow bananas, they
will grow drugs."'00
A.

U.S. Concerns About Drugs in the Caribbean
Region

The Caribbean Region has been a source of grave concern to
States regarding the flow of illegal narcotics through
United
the
the Region. Not only do these Caribbean countries produce a
significant amount of marijuana' they are also "ideally located
traffickers from the producing
on the transit routes of cocaine
12
centers in South America."

The Caribbean has been experiencing a "rapid expansion of
drug trafficking-resulting from a shift in tactics by the
Colombian drug cartels-[which] has begun to corrupt
in the smallest nations. " "'
particularly
governments,
Unfortunately this expansion coincides with the economic crises
experienced by the Caribbean nations due to the sudden
downward change in the market for their "legal" regional export,
This loss of banana exports could in turn "push
bananas.'
island nations toward becoming offshore banking and tax
havens.., making them all the more attractive to money
launderers and drug dealers."'
This has led the United States to cultivate close ties with the
Caribbean nations through various Aid and Development
programs"' as well as through mutual-legal-assistance treaties. 7
100. Boustany, supra note 7.
101. See generally BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS & LAW ENFORCEMENT
AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (1998)
available at <http://www.state.gov/www/global/narotics law/1998_report> (visited Feb.

27, 2000) [hereinafter INCS Report].
102. Jorge I. Dominguez, Introduction to FROM PIRATES TO DRUG LORDS: THE POSTCOLD WAR CARIBBEAN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 2 (Michael C. Desch, Jorge I. Dominguez,
& Andres Serbin eds.) (1998).

103. Kovaleski & Farah, supra note 96.
104. See id.

105. Id.
106. See USIS, U.S. Dep't of State FactSheet: Certificationfor Drug-ProducingStates,
July 1, 1999 (visited Feb. 22, 2000) <http://www.usembassy.org.uk/drugsl7.html>. See
also USAID, U.S. Dep't of State, Congressional Presentation FY 1999 Request: LAC

Regional (visited Feb. 22, 2000) <http'/www.info.usaid.gov/pubs/cp99/lac/cp99rsd.htm>.
107. See GRIFFITH, supra note 94, at 213. These treaties provide for the training,
asset sharing, intelligence, material and technical support, and interdiction. See also
John McCain, Renewing American Foreign Policy: Values and Strategy, 5 BROWN J. OF
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These Aid and Development programs allow the United States to
provide assistance in areas of economic growth, agriculture,
population, health, and environment. 8 However there are
strings attached to the release of this aid if the benefiting
country is a "major" drug-producing and/or drug-transit
country. 109 There is a form of "certification" that the benefiting
country must meet before the funds are distributed."'
The procedure involved in receiving certification requires
that the President of the United States determine whether the
country in question has "cooperated fully with the United States,
or has taken adequate steps on its own, to achieve the
counternarcotics goal and objectives of the 1988 U.N. Drug
Convention.""'
Only after a country has received "full
certification" can all aid that was withheld be released."2 If a
country fails the certification process, the United States is
required to deny the country most forms of non-emergency aid'
and vote against any proposed loans by multilateral development
banks."4
The United States, by virtue of the threat to withhold aid,
was able to persuade many of the Caribbean nations to enter into
mutual-legal-assistance treaties with them."0 This has caused
the feeling amongst many of these nations that "Washington has
tried to bully them into joining its war against drugs without
providing the resources to do the job."" 6 The main area of
WORLD AFF. 54 (1998). 'Today it is taken for granted that steady U.S. policy promoting
and protecting freedom, democratic systems, free markets, and free trade was both right
and essential." Id.
108. See USAID, supra note 106. See also Sarbanes, supra note 59, at 62. "Today,

the greatest potential threat to the safety and well-being of American in the world we face
is... transnational problems such as ... drug-trafficking. These are not the kinds of
threats that lend themselves to solo solutions. They require genuine and sustained
political and economic cooperation." Id.
109. See USIS, supra note 106.
110. See id.
111. USIS, supra note 106.
112. Id.
113. See id.
According to the U.S. Department of State, "Denial of certification
requires the United States to deny sales or financing under the Arms Export Control Act;

deny non-food assistance under Public Law 480; deny financing by the Export-Import
Bank; and withhold most assistance under the [Foreign Assistance Act of 19611 with the

exception of specified humanitarian and counternarcotics assistance." rd.
114. See id.

115. See GRIFFITH, supra note 94, at 193.
116. Caribbean Leaders Ready Complaints List for Clinton Visit, Dow JONES INT'L
NEWS, May 9, 1997.
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dissatisfaction with these treaties and agreements is that the
17
United States has impinged too much on national sovereignty
in trying to maintain their anti-drug strategy for the region while
giving too little in return. 8
B. ShipriderAgreement
An important tool for the United States to control the
movement of international narcotics is its use of the various
Maritime Counter-Drug (Shiprider) agreements with the
Caribbean nations.
These reciprocal agreements allow law
enforcement officers of either party to the agreement to conduct
operations for the prevention, detection and suppression of drug
trafficking in each other's territorial waters."0
The main
incentive for these Caribbean nations to enter into these
agreements was the "inability of Caribbean countries to tackle
the problem of illegal drug trafficking."2 ° One problem in
particular is the increasing frequency of "air and sea drops" from
the South American drug
cartels to their "local criminal
1 21
partners" in the Caribbean.

These Shiprider agreements have come under attack mostly
because of the Caribbean countries' perception of the breach of
their sovereignty by the United States. 2 2 This is due in a large
way to the demands by the United States which require "political
and
bureaucratic
adaptations"
along
with
"resource
allocations."22 In the case of Barbados and Jamaica, both were
reluctant to enter into a Shiprider
agreement until the question
2
of sovereignty was settled.1 1

117. See GRIFFITH, supra note 94, at 222.

118. See generally Anthony T. Bryan, The State of the Region: Trends Affecting the
Future of CaribbeanSecurity, in FROM PIRATES TO DRUG LORDS, supra note 102, at 45.
119. See generally T & T Shiprider, supra note 9. See also Shiprider Takes Effect,
JAM. GLEANER, Mar. 11, 1998.
120. Shiprider Takes Effect, supra note 119.
121. Id.
122. See Bryan, supra note 118. The policy dilemma for small Caribbean countries is
that while they cannot curtail the drug trade, the current anti-drug strategies of the
United States threaten to impinge on their sovereignty and independent legal systems.
See id. at 46.
123. See GRIFFITH, supra note 94, at 195.

124. See id. at 22.
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The negotiations with Jamaica led to an agreement125 that
there will be "no random patrolling," and that the "U.S.
authorities [are] required to apply on a 'case-by-case' basis before
being allowed, or denied, permission to board and search
vessels." 2 ' Additionally, these operations will be under the
control of Jamaican law enforcement officials according to
Jamaican law.1"7 Jamaican Prime Minister P.J. Patterson stated
that "in the event of U.S. agents being in 'hot pursuit' of
suspected trafficker and cannot apply for permission, they will be
allowed into Jamaican waters or airspace but only to maintain
Barbados soon followed suit after lengthy
contact."128
negotiations with the United States, and on June 25, 1997,
signed their own "Shiprider" agreement with the United States. 9
C.

U.S.-CaribbeanSummit in Barbados, 1997

Realizing the need to strengthen and maintain relations
among the Caribbean nations, President Clinton met with the
leaders of the Caribbean Community May 10, 1997, for the U.S.Caribbean Summit.13 ° The focus of this historic summit was the
linkage by the U.S. officials of trade to the cooperation on the
drug front."1 There were, however, reminders that the region
125. See Agreement Concerning Cooperation in Suppressing Illicit Maritime Drug
Trafficking, U.S.-Jam. (entered into force Mar. 10, 1998) KA.V. 5155 available in 1998
WL 190434 [hereinafter Jamaican Shiprider]. While Jamaica signed the agreement on
May 6, 1997, it could not be entered into force until domestic legislation to give effect to
the agreement was passed by Parliament. The Maritime Drug Trafficking (Suppression)
Act which gives effect to the accord, was passed by Parliament in February of 1998. See
ShipriderTakes Effect, supra note 119.
126. See Jamaica Reaches Drug Accord With U.S., REUTERS N. AM. WIRE, May 5,
1997, availablein LEXIS, NEWS Library, Allnws File. In other words, the United States
Coast Guard vessels and aircraft can now legally enter Jamaica's territorial waters to
intercept ships, boats and planes suspected to be transporting drugs to or from the island.
See id. See also Shiprider Takes Effect, supranote 119.
127. See Jamaican Shiprider, supra note 125, art. 7.
128. Jamaica Reaches Drug Accord With U.S., supra note 126. The controversy over
"hot pursuit" arose when Barbados and Jamaica insisted that the U.S. may not extend its
hot pursuit" of suspected traffickers into the islands' twelve-mile territorial waters. See
GRIFFITH, supra note 95, at 22.
129. See Agreement Concerning Co-operation in Suppressing illicit Maritime Drug
Trafficking, U.S.-Barb., (entered into force Oct. 11, 1998) KA.V. 5337(S) available in
1998 WL 773436 [hereinafter Barbados Shiprider].
130. See President Clinton Signed Modest Drug-Fighting and Trade, SAN ANTONIO
ExPRESS-NEWS, May 11, 1997, at 6A.

131. See Caribbean Leaders Ready Complaints List For Clinton Visit, Dow JONES
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has felt neglected, illustrated by CARICOM chairman, Jamaican
Prime Minster P.J. Patterson, who remarked that "no
relationship, however valuable, will endure forever if constantly
taken for granted."132
When pressed about the role of the United States in the
banana dispute, Clinton commented that "the United States
supports duty-free access to the EU market for Caribbean
bananas-but will continue to oppose preferences that give
European marketing and distribution firms an advantage over
U.S. companies."" He also added that the United States was
targeting "a discriminatory European system not Caribbean
bananas.""4
At the conclusion of the summit, both Clinton and the
Caribbean Heads of Government signed the Partnership for
Prosperity and Security in the Caribbean, known as the
Bridgetown Accord."' This accord recognized the "inextricable
link between trade, economic development, security and
prosperity."'3 6
D. Criticismsof Summit
Unfortunately, many of the Caribbean leaders complained
that the United States has done little to implement the decisions
While the summit was to be the start of a "new
of the summit.'
era of cooperation between the United States and Caricom," 38 the
United States has not kept up its side of the bargain. The
Caribbean nations have fulfilled their end of the agreement by
"allowing U.S. law enforcers to pursue suspected drug smugglers
into their territorial airspace and waters," while the United
"acted only in the drug and security areas that are its
States has
"13
concern. 9
INT'L NEWS, May 9, 1997.
132. PresidentClinton Signed Modest Drug-Fightingand Trade, supra note 130.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See CARICOM Website, supra note 8.
136. President Clinton Signed Modest Drug-Fightingand Trade, supra note 130.
137. See Carole Landry, Caribbean Nations Want US to Pay Attention to its "Real
Battle", AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Apr. 6, 1998, available at 1998 WL 2256415.

138. Id.
139. U.S. Aide Visiting Caribbean Countries Annoyed With U.S., DOW JONES NEWS
SERVICE, Sept. 14, 1998.
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In addition, the United States had pledged to "help the
Organization of Eastern Caribbean States join the InterAmerican Development Bank and give $3 million to help
diversify the economies of Eastern Caribbean islands hurt by the
successful U.S. challenge to their banana regime." 4 ' Yet sixteen
months later these islands are still waiting.
Another sore point for the CARICOM is the seeming
reluctance of Congress to "extend NAFTA [sic] benefits to
Caribbean countries and the Clinton administration's stand in a
trade dispute over bananas as obstacles to economic progress in
the region.""' The U.S. anti-drug strategy is being undermined
by a lack of attention to the area's economic needs.'
E.

CaribbeanReaction to the Banana War

The overwhelming belief throughout the Caribbean is that
the United States does not care about the detrimental
consequences to the Caribbean that will eventually ensue from
the United States's stand against the EU over the EC banana
regime. This has led the Prime Minister of Dominica, one of the
four islands in the Windward group whose economies depend
heavily on bananas, to declare that the United States is
"determined to damage the region's banana industry."' In fact
he was "appalled by this action by the US."'"
Others warned the United States that relations with the
Caribbean could be "severely compromised" by challenges to the
Incoming CARICOM leader, Kenny
local banana trade. 4 '
Anthony, St. Lucia's Prime Minister, criticized the United States
as being "reckless in its efforts to undermine the viability of the
140. Id.
141. Dave Williams, Caribbean Leader Casts U.S. as Obstacle to Economic Progress,
STATES NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 17, 1998.
142. See id. "They're inextricably linked, it's a self-defeating approach if you push
one hand and not the other." Id. (statement of Edwin W. Carrington, CARICOM
Secretary General). Any serious disruption to Caribbean exports to Europe would cause
economic collapse on banana-growing islands, leading to social unrest even in parts of the
region that rely more on tourism than bananas. See id.
143. Id.
144. Id. He further added, "If the European Union capitulates, regional banana
exporters will be the ones to suffer. The US is quite aware of the likely social, political
and economic consequences." Id.
145. Banana Trade Threatens US/Caribbean Relations-CARICOM Head, JAM.
GLEANER, July 7, 1998.
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banana industry."14 Prime Minister Lester Bird of Antigua and
Barbuda was very vocal against the United States "for placing
undue pressure on Caribbean countries in the battle against drug
trafficking and money laundering."4 v
F.

St. Vincent: An Example of Increased Drug
Productionin the Wake of DecreasedBanana
Production

Hundreds of St. Vincentians are reported to be growing
marijuana on the island, with several claiming that they do so
because they cannot find legitimate jobs. 14 While the island's
cultivation has not yet reached the 5,000 hectares limit, it still is
the largest producer and smuggler of marijuana in the eastern
Caribbean.14

Here, the revenue from marijuana production

exceeds the national budget." St. Vincent suffers from very high
have benefited
households
unemployment, but many
For example,
trade."'
mainly
to
the
marijuana
tremendously due
"people who had shacks now have very good houses. People who
52
couldn't pay the bus fare now own vehicles."

On December 8, 1998, the government of St. Vincent
launched a major U.S.-backed marijuana eradication program in
the island's mountain region."' Prior to the raids, marijuana
farmers and their supporters staged a peaceful picket outside the

146. Id.
147. Bird Attacks US, Europe, JAM. GLEANER, May 28, 1998. Prime Minister Bird
went even further when he stated that:
"if no drugs were transiting this region and no possibility of money
laundering, the Caribbean would be relegated to the backwater of the world
with not the slightest interest shown in our circumstances unless there was a
sudden breakdown in democracy and the rule of law leading to civil unrest,
bloodshed and refugees."
Id.
148. See Island Under Rain on Marijuana Strike Day, HERALD (St. Vincent & the
Grenadines) Dec. 8, 1998, at 7 availableat <http://heraldsvg.com> (visited Mar. 3, 1999).
149. See INCS Report, supra note 101.
150. See The Best BroadcastTranscripts:From CaribbeanRadio: 'If You Don't Like us
Growing Ganja, Give us Another Crop', THE GUARDIAN (LONDON), Dec. 5, 1998, at 19,
availablein LEXIS, NEWS Library, ALLWLD File.
151. See id.
152. Id.
153. See Marijuana Raid Begins Despite Rains, HERALD (St. Vincent & the
Grenadines) Dec. 9, 1998, at 7.
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offices of Prime Minister Sir James Mitchell."' They protested
the planned eradication of their crops, and made known their
views about the role of the United States in the raid."'
The main arguments against the raid are: (1) it creates a lot
of damage (people's legal agricultural crops are destroyed along
with their houses); (2) there is no real indication whether the
chemicals used in the destruction of marijuana plantations are
harmful to normal agricultural production; and (3) there "should
be some package negotiated with the Americans in order to
ensure that the people who will be affected have some alternative
means of survival."156
One million plants are expected to be destroyed by the end of
this exercise."' The value of a mature plant is about $1,000
(U.S.) on the New York market according to the most recent
estimate by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency.9 The end result
of this raid is that "about US$1 billion in total crops

. . .

were

from the streets of some marketplace around the
removed
59

world.

IV. BARBADOS' RALLYING CRY: NON-RENEWAL OF SHIPRIDER
Faced with empty promises made by the United States
following the Bridgetown Accord and the threatened demise of
the banana industry, Barbados has called upon the members of
the CARICOM to join together to resolve the issue.6 The "entire
Caribbean was disappointed with the failure of President Clinton
to focus on trade and economic issues as promised when he met
Caribbean leaders last year, while matters pertaining to justice
154. See St.Vincent: Marijuana Growers Stage Peaceful Protest Outside PM's Office,
BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Dec. 8, 1998, at pt. 5.
155. See id. Among the messages carried on placards were: "Give us jobs or leave us

alone:, "Stop the advantage on small nations, Mr. America [slogan as received]" and,
"Yankeys [spelling as received] stay home, clean up your front-yard" and "American

plants more ganja than the entire Caribbean combined", some of which were stuck along
the wire fencing surrounding the complex. Id.
156. See The Best Broadcast Transcripts:From CaribbeanRadio, supra note 150. In
Nicaragua and Columbia, where the U.S. government is involved in the eradication of
drug plantations, there is always some agreement to provide alternative economic
support. See id.
157. See St.Vincent Drug EradicationProgramme Winds Down, JAM. GLEANER, Dec.
15, 1998.
158. See id.
159. Id.
160. See B'dos Wants Joint Banana/Shiprider Agreement, supra note 10.
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and security had been put on a fast track."161 Barbados has
requested that the CARICOM members not renew their
Shiprider agreements, if "Washington does not act on the trade
issues so important to the small Caribbean countries."'62 In
addition, the Prime Minister of Barbados said, "You cannot
expect to have progress in the fight against drugs while that part
of the Bridgetown Accord that deals with the banana regime is
Barbados sees it as unacceptable for the
not being honored."'
United States to bully weaker countries of limited resources into
4
treaties and concessions without providing anything in return.
A.

Consequencesof Non-Renewal

The immediate repercussion faced by the Caribbean nations
if they refuse to renew the Shiprider agreements is the U.S.
threat of withholding economic aid.'65 But this threat does not
mean as much today as it once did because at the end of the Cold
War, "[flrom 1985 to 1995, U.S. aid to the Caribbean nations fell
by 90 percent, from $226 million to $ 22 million."'6 6 In addition,
the aid that was promised by the Clinton administration after
the Bridgetown Accord has not been received, so the threat of
withholding will not persuade the CARICOM nations to change
their minds.'67 The United States, on the other hand, needs these
agreements to secure their borders against the entry of illicit
drugs. 168
So the question becomes can the Caribbean nations make
this leverage work? Getting these nations to "unite for their own
self-interest" is not a sure thing. 6 9 A recent statement by the
CARICOM lashed out against the unilateral action taken by the

161. Id.
162. BarbadosLeader Might End Anti-Drug CooperationWith U.S., DOW JONES INT'L
NEWS, Aug. 15, 1998.

163. Id.
164. See id.
165. See USIS, supra note 106.
166. Kovaleski & Farah, supra note 95. Now some U.S. officials say they fear drug
traffickers are rushing to fill that gap, in some cases focusing their attention on
penetrating governments. See Williams, supra note 141.
167. See U.S. Aide Visiting CaribbeanCountriesAnnoyed With U.S., supra note 139.
168. See generally INCS Report, supra note 101.
169. See Geof Brown, Facing the US 'Economic Terrorism', JAM. GLEANER, Nov. 20,
1998, at A4.
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United States in imposing sanctions.'70 In it, the countries of the
Caribbean Community "agreed to immediately review the
Bridgetown Accord to determine the basis for continued
cooperation." ' ' If they continue to present a united front against
the United States, they will be a force to be reckoned with.
B.

Promised U.S. Aid Package

Finally, in September 1998, the United States announced a
three-year US$ 4.7 million economic diversification project for
the Windward Islands.'
This program evolved out of the May
The United
10, 1997, U.S.-Caribbean summit in Barbados.
States official who announced the project's release admitted that
this aid was in response to "a very serious problem in public
perceptions in the Eastern Caribbean where we were seen as not
only indifferent to, but hostile to, Eastern Caribbean interests.''
Coincidentally, this release of funds came soon after Barbados
Prime Minister Owen publicly announced that Barbados would
not be renewing their Shiprider agreement.'74 The other concern
of the American diplomats in the region is that they have found
Caribbean leaders to be "fearful and resentful, wondering
whether economic globalization will leave them destitute."'
The show of assistance by the United States may be a case of
too little, too late. As Prime Minister Anthony put it, "We have
experienced a situation where the United States had said one
thing and done the very opposite; made one announcement today
and the very next day something else has happened. There is
now a serious credibility problem. I think distrust is a more
appropriate word." 76 It will take the Caribbean
nations a very
177
long time to put the banana issue behind them.
170. "That the U.S's recent action strikes at the very heart of the partnership with
the Caribbean-its security and prosperity-and calls into question the entire
partnership agreement." Id.
171. Id.
172. See U.S. Project for Banana States, CARIBBEAN UPDATE, Nov. 1, 1998, available

in LEXIS, News Library, Allnews File.
173. Id.
174. See Barbados Leader Might End Anti-Drug Cooperation With U.S., supra note
162.

175.
176.
Dec. 23,
177.

Gedda, supranote 12.
Don Bohning, Banana Wars Snag Caribbean Island Nations, MIAMI HERALD,
1998, at C1.
See id.
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C. CARICOM Takes A Stand
Angry over the United States announcement of the
imposition of tariffs and the refusal to end its opposition to the
preferential treatment for the Caribbean bananas, the
CARICOM leaders decided to take a stand."' In their two-day
Inter-Sessional Summit held in Suriname on March 4, 1999, the
leaders voted to suspend the 1997 Bridgetown trade and security
agreement with the United States. 9 One of the reasons voiced
for this move was that its declaration would serve as a "stinging
and embarrassing rebuke of American action," which will harm
the Caribbean economies even though the Clinton administration
denies it.'
In an effort to undo the damage to its relations with the
Caribbean Community, the United States undertook a series of
steps to win back some of the ground lost. This began with the
hosting of a meeting in Washington on July 22, 1999, to try and
clear up any misunderstandings and clarify the issues between
Then, on August 6, 1999, President Clinton sent
the parties.'
his presidential envoy to the Americas, Kenneth H. MacKay, Jr.,
to visit the eastern Caribbean nations. 82 MacKay was part of a
mission to "stimulate sustained economic integration and
To accomplish this, the U.S.
development" in this region.'
178. See Bert Wilkinson, Trade-Caribbean:CARICOM Suspends Treaty With U.S.
Over Bananas, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Mar. 9, 1999.
179. See id.
180. Id. See also Caricom Leaders "Deplore" US Banana War Against EU, BBC
SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS,

Mar. 16, 1999, available at LEXIS, News Library,

Curnws file. The CARICOM issued a statement which began:
The countries of the Caribbean community have agreed to immediately review
the Bridgetown accord to determine the basis for continued cooperation. We,
the heads of state and government of the Caribbean community, meeting in
Paramaribo, Surinam, deplore the precipitate unilateral action of the United
States to impose sanctions against the European Union (EU) over its banana
import regime.
Id. CARICOM closed with the observation that "[t]he United States' recent action thus
strikes at the very heart of the partnership with the Caribbean-its security and
prosperity-and calls into question the entire partnership agreement." Id.
181. See Rickey Singh, Washington Meeting on CARICOM-USA Relations, JAM.
GLEANER, July 21, 1999, at Al.
182. See Carmel L. Haynes, Clinton's Envoy MacKay Says U.S. Needs Caribbean as
Much as, Well, Vice Versa, BROAD STREET J., Aug. 20, 1999, available at
<http://broadstreetjournal.com> (visited Feb. 27, 2000).
183. Id. In a move calculated to mend the U.S. fences with his hosts, MacKay
emphasized that the Caribbean nations were not the target of the dispute between the EU
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delegation promised the availability of aid in the amount of
US$30 million to the region, once the Council for Finance and
Planning in Washington finally approves it. 1

4

The final step

towards reconciliation with the Caribbean nations came on
November 3, 1999, in the form of the passage of the merged
African Growth and Opportunity Act and
the U.S.-Caribbean
185
Basin Trade Enhancement Act (CBTEA).

Unfortunately, these steps have been criticized as being "too
little, too late" by many in the Caribbean." 6 It has been
approximately two years since the Bridgetown Accord where the
United States and President Clinton promised economic
8 7 During that time the Caribbean nations lived up to
assistance."
their end, while it has taken the United States this long to get
around to "fulfilling" their side of the agreement. Even the
CBTEA does not go as far as the Caribbean nations would like, it
provides for "temporary" provisions to give the benefits to
"certain beneficiary countries."'
V. CONCLUSION
Regardless of whether the United States intended to hurt
the Caribbean nations with its stance in the Banana War, the
damage has been done. The actions of the world's two largest
trading parties, with their apparent disregard of the negotiation
process to resolve disputes, has rubbed off on the Caribbean
nations. In turn, these nations, desperate to have the United
States resolve their plight, have resorted to the only weapon they
have-the threat of not renewing their Shiprider agreements.
Whether these nations are ready to face the consequences of
possible U.S. retaliation is another matter.

and the United States, and that "the problem had been simple oversight and taking
people for granted." Id.
184. See id. This aid would be used to help with "economic diversification and
employment, environmental management, strengthening judicial structures in the region
and disaster handling." Id.
185. See U.S. Department of Commerce, Statement by U.S. Secretary of Commerce
William M. Daley on the Passage of the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act and the
Caribbean Basin Trade Enhancement Act, Nov. 3, 1999, (visited Feb. 27, 2000)
<http'//204.193.246.62/public.nsf/docs/A50FD106D4F837988525681F0050E53A>.
See
also S.1389, 106th Cong. (1999).
186. See Clinton Envoy Offers Too Little, Too Late, BROAD STREET J., Aug. 20, 1999.
187. See PresidentClinton Signed Modest Drug-Fightingand Trade, supra note 130.
188. See S. 1389, 106th Cong. § 101 (1999).
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Resolution of this conflict lies in how badly the United States
needs these agreements in the war on drugs. Since the United
States did not back down in the dispute against the EU, they
may need to find other ways to rebuild relations with the
Caribbean. This can only be done by assisting the region
economically, starting with complying with the spirit of the
Bridgetown Accord with regards to trade, and helping find a
viable alternative to drugs in the region. The United States has
begun attempts to make these changes, but still more needs to be
done.
On the other hand, the Caribbean nations have seen the U.S.
response to their threats of not renewing their treaties. It has
prompted the United States to offer aid to the Caribbean nations
with the promise of more to come. This demonstrates that the
United States values keeping the Shiprider agreements alive and
validates the decision by CARICOM to use non-renewal as an
effective threat. The question remains whether CARICOM will
use this threat again against the United States in subsequent
negotiations if they believe that they have been slighted. For the
moment, it seems highly likely since these Caribbean nations
have little more to lose economically. If the United States cuts
off aid, they are very likely to disregard all anti-drug treaties in
favor of the lure of easy drug money.
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VI. APPENDIX

A. EC Banana Regime Reform'89

OLD REGIME

WTO FINDINGS

NEW REGIME

(REGULATIONS 404/93 &

(REGULATION 404/98, AS

1442/93 PLUS BANANA

AMENDED BY 1637/98,

FRAMEWORK

PLUS COMMISSION
REGULATION 2362/98)

AGREEMENT)
B licenses

Inconsistent

abolished-now single licensing
system for all origins

Allocation of licenses according

Inconsistent

Abolished-new rights to licenses
based on proof of actual imports

to a), b), c) marketing functions
Quota allocations to some but

Inconsistent - although

Quotas allocated only to all

not all suppliers including

appellate body recognised WTO

substantial buyers, ACP tariff

allocations to individual

compatibilityof zero duty

preference capped at traditional

traditional ACP countries

preference for traditionalACP

levels

quantity
Transferability of country

Inconsistent

Abolished

Inconsistent

only on a non-discriminatory

quotas
Allocation of hurricane licenses

basis

to EU/ACP operators
Inconsistent

Abolished

aid to Community producers

not challenged

Retained

Bound tariff quota of 2.2 Mt

Consistent

Retained

Autonomous concessions

Retained with duty same as

Special export certificates to
some countries and not to
others

(million tonnes)
addt'l quantity of 353,000
tonnes

EC

TRQ

189. Directorate General for Trade, The US/EU Banana Dispute: Modificationsto the
Nov.,
10
1998)
tbl.
2
(last
modified
Banana
Regime,

<http'//europa.eu.int/comm/dg0/1011banan.htm>.
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B.

USTR's FinalProductList19

The imposition of 100% duties will apply to products that are
both: (1) classified in the subheading of the Harmonized Tariff
Schedule of the United States listed above; and (2) the product of
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, or the United Kingdom. Note that 100% duties will not
apply to HTS 85167000, electrothermic coffee or tea makers, for
domestic purposes that are produced in Italy. The product
descriptions in the table above are provided for the convenience
of the reader and are not intended to delimit in any way the
scope of the products, which is to be determined by the HTS
number.
HTS No.

Product Description

30073050

Bath preparations, other than bath salts

42022215

Handbags, with or without shoulder straps or without handle, with outer surface of
sheeting of plastics

42023210

Articles of a kind normally carried in the pocket or handbag, with outer surface of
reinforced or laminated plastics

48055000

Uncoated felt paper and paperboard in rolls or sheets

48192000

Folding cartons, boxes and cases of noncorrugated paper or paperboard

49119120

Lithographs on paper or paperboard, not over 0.51 mm in thickness, printed not over 20
years at time of importation

63022190

Bed linen, not knit or crochet, printed, of cotton, not containing any embroidery, lace,
braid, edging, trimming, piping or appliqu6 work, not napped

85072080

Lead-acid storage batteries other than of a kind used for starting piston engines or as
the primary source of power for electric vehicles

85167100

Electrothermic coffee or tea makers, for domestic purposes (Except Italy)

190. USTR ANNOUNCES FINAL PRODUCT LIST IN BANANAS DISPUTE, U.S.T.R. PRESS
RELEASE 99-35 (Apr. 9, 1999) available in <http://www.ustr.gov/releases/1999/04/9935.html> (visited Feb. 27, 2000).

